A Word or Two About the V-Word

The word "vagina" has been popping up a lot in my twitter feed the last few days - all on account of the flap in Michigan about Rep. Lisa Brown's remarks to the MI House of Delegates. The subject of the debate was anti-abortion legislation. Here's what Rep. Brown is quoted as saying on April 13:

“Finally, Mr. Speaker, I’m flattered that you’re all so interested in my vagina, but ‘no’ means ‘no,’”

You can hear Rep. Brown's speech HERE

The Speaker pro tem (Rep. John Walsh) wasn't happy. The result: Rep. Brown wasn't allowed to speak the following day. The issue? A spokesman for the Speaker's Office said this:

“It has nothing to do with her using the word ‘vagina.' The Speaker Protempore at the time was John Walsh. It was his judgment at the time that when she finished her statement by referencing her vagina, and then saying ‘no means no,’ that was drawing in a rape reference, and he felt that crossed the line.”

 Can we believe that?

I'm on Rep. Brown's side when it comes to the abortion issue. She was angry; I understand why. But that's not the question I'm trying to worry here. What I'm asking is whether someone could reasonably take Rep. Brown's words as the speaker pro tem supposedly did. It seems to me the answer is yes. You don't have to be a prude, let alone a Michigan Republican, to hear "I'm flattered that you're all so interested in my vagina" as a not-so-oblique sexual reference. And when you add "'No' means 'no'" it's also hard not to hear a reference to rape.

A small thought experiment. Suppose Rep. Brown had said "I'm intrigued that you're all so interested in my uterus. But it's not yours. It's mine and you need to leave it alone." My bet is that nothing would have happened.

"Aha!" you say. "The word 'vagina' really was the issue."

Not so fast. I'm not saying that the word 'vagina' didn't have anything to do with the reaction. I'm saying that it wasn't the word as such. It was what the whole remark suggested. The judgment call was that this was, as they say, unparliamentary language. Legislatures have much stricter codes of decorum than political rallies. (That, after all, is why legislators keep saying "Mr. Speaker" when it's clear that they're not really addressing the speaker.)

Was not letting her speak the next day the right reaction? I'm for more speech rather than less, but here's something I don't know; if you do, you can bring me up to speed. What are the usual parliamentary sanctions for unparliamentary language? I'd want to know that before I decide that Rep. Walsh was out of line on that call.

But why am I fussing about niceties of language? It's partly because there are lots of real issues to discuss, and I'd rather they get discussed head-on. I also get tired of the cycle of talking about words when words aren't the issue. I felt that way when Republicans pounced on President Obama's comparison between the private and public sectors. Of course the private sector isn't doing as well as we'd like. But that wasn't the point of the president's comment. And I felt the same way when Democrats grabbed hold of Gov. Romney's remark that "corporations are people." What he clearly meant, if you go back and listen, was that corporations are made up of people; he meant pretty much the opposite of what liberals pretended.

I think we do better talking about hot-button issues when we watch what we say. My own view is that there's plenty to be said on behalf of Rep. Brown's point of view. Among other things, I think her point about religious conscience was a powerful one. But someone could agree with that (as I do) and also think (as I also do) that her next remark, taken in context, may have crossed a parliamentary line and that the speaker, whose job it is to mind such matters, was not out of bounds to see it that way. Pretending it's all about the word "vagina" is a distraction at best and disingenuous at worst.

There's a broader and more important point. I disagree deeply with the prevailing Republican view on abortion, for reasons that would call for a separate discussion. That said, my disagreement is tempered in this way: there are many people who honestly, sincerely see most case of abortion as the murder of the innocent. If I saw things as they do, I'd be in favor of the very laws that, as it happens, Rep. Brown and I both oppose. But I don't think that people who disagree with me are fools or evil on that account, or that they have to be motivated by a perverse desire to control women. As I tell my students every time it comes up, the abortion issue is a hard one; if you think otherwise, you need to think some more. For exactly that reason, I'd really like to find ways to talk about it that one side or the other won't see as rhetorical bomb-throwing.

What "marriage" means and why it doesn't matter

Bad arguments about same-sex marriage have a bad habit: they keep coming back. I'd like to take a look at one particular repeat offender. The short version is that by definition marriage is between a man and a woman, and so recognizing same-sex marriage would be confusion. The argument comes in two versions, and I'll say something about both, but it's worth noticing that even people who favor civil unions offer some variation of this argument as a reason for not supporting same-sex marriage.

The first version is the crude one. The idea is that the meaning of the word "marriage" covers opposite- sex but not same-sex unions. ("Look it up!" you might hear.) The trouble is that the meanings of words aren't carved into reality. Words mean what we mean by them; what we mean can and does change. Even supposing that at the moment "marriage" means a union between a woman and a man, all this would show is that at the moment, most people use the word that way.

As it happens, however, if you like the "by definition" argument, the dictionaries aren't as clearly with you as you might think. Here's the first definition from the online version of Merriam-Webster:

...the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law

But right on its heels, we find this one:

"the state of being united to a person of the same sex in a relationship like that of a traditional marriage"

Dictionaries don't dictate meaning; they record usage. What Merriam-Webster tells us is that usage is changing. People who describe same-sex unions as marriages aren't confused about the meanings of words, but people who argue against same-sex marriage on lexicographic grounds are confused about what "meaning" means.

This brings us to version two - the sophisticated version. It doesn't depend on dictionaries; it agrees that we could use the word marriage in any way we choose. What's at stake on this version of the argument is something about reality - "definition" in the sense of essence.

An artificial example might help. We use the word "water" to pick out a particular kind of substance - a substance with a real nature, or so many people say. We could decide to use the word "water" to refer to any clear, drinkable liquid. However, even if we called vodka "water," vodka and water are very different substances and the difference isn't  a matter of convention; it's in the nature of the things themselves. (Not everyone will go along with the idea of things having real natures, but as we'll see, allowing the point won't do any harm.) Furthermore, there are laws on the books about water (about levels of contamination, for example, and about water rights) and in applying those laws it would be disastrously crazy to ignore the difference between the substance we now call "water" and other substances we might decide to apply the word to.

Some people argue that the same point applies to marriage. We could use the word marriage in any way we liked, but there's a certain real kind of relationship picked out by the word "marriage" as it has been used traditionally. That reality, so the argument goes, is very different from same-sex relationships.

An extended version of this argument turns up in a paper called "What is Marriage?" by Girgis, George and Anderson (GGA). (Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 245-287, Winter 2010.) You can read it here:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722155

According to GGA,

marriage is not a legal construct with totally malleable contours—not “just a contract.” Otherwise, how could the law get marriage wrong? Rather, some sexual relationships are instances of a distinctive kind of relationship—call it real marriage— that has its own value and structure, whether the state recognizes it or not, and is not changed by laws based on a false conception of it. Like the relationship between parents and their children, or between the parties to an ordinary promise, real marriages are moral realities.

A bit later, they add:

...the state cannot choose or change the essence of real marriage; so in radically reinventing legal marriage, the state would obscure a moral reality

As for what this reality is, GGA argue that reproduction is at its core. The claim isn't that marriages must produce children to be real marriages, but what partly creates and "seals" a marriage is an act (sexual intercourse) that by its nature is associated with reproduction. GGA argue that marriages can still be marriages even if the couple is infertile, or even if the couple deliberately avoids reproducing. Readers can decide for themselves on how well GGA handle this issue, but I want to set it aside; my point is a different one.

Suppose that there is a real, non-conventional relationship between individuals with pretty much the character that GGA emphasize. Let's suppose that this relationship has a nature or essence every bit as real as the nature or essence of water. Even if this is true, it doesn't tell us whether there should be a legal institution of marriage that extends to same-sex partners. Interestingly, GGA give us the clue to seeing why. The crucial sentence is this one:

Like the relationship between parents and their children, or between the parties to an ordinary promise, real marriages are moral realities.

Insofar as I understand the notion of a moral reality I agree that parenthood and promises count. But consider parenthood. I have two children. They're my biological children, and that's not a matter of convention. However, my relationship with my children isn't just biological. I hope I'm their parent in a fuller sense than that, even if biology is where the relationship got its start. So let's agree: between me and my children there's a relationship that GGA might call "real parenthood". But suppose someone tried to argue from the biological and moral reality of this kind of relationship to the conclusion that the law shouldn't recognize adoptive parenthood. That would be a howlingly bad argument.

In the sense of "real" that GGA have in mind, adoptive parenthood isn't "real parenthood." But the fact that the law allows adoption and treats adoptive parenthood on a par with the biology-based kind is a  very good thing. There's no "obscuring of a moral reality" here. There's a broadening of a legal/social institution for good reasons.

Promising is a different kind of case. Let's grant that when I make a promise, that creates a moral reality: I come to have an obligation to the person I made the promise to. Obviously, however, the "moral reality" of promising depends on conventions. That doesn't make the obligation less real, but it makes the point that human conventions can give rise to moral realities. Second, which cases of promising fall under the law can't be settled by looking at the moral realities. There are promises the law doesn't enforce, and there are promises that meet the letter of the law even though we might think that if it weren't for the law, they wouldn't count.

This bears on same-sex marriage in two ways. First, even if same-sex unions aren't "real" in the  metaphysical way that GGA have in mind, this doesn't answer the question of whether the law should recognize them. Second, even if same-sex marriage depends on adopting new conventions, that doesn't rule out there being a moral reality that goes with it.

Here conservatives raise a worry. Without a clear account of marriage really is, the argument goes, we're on a slippery slope to including incestuous "marriages" and polygamous unions. However, if that's your worry, appealing to the meaning of the word "marriage" or the nature of marriage won't help. Polygamous unions have been around for a very long time. There's no linguistic confusion in saying that Solomon had many wives. If you're worried about polygamy, appealing to the meaning of the word "marriage" won't help. As for the "nature" or "essence" of marriage, it's completely unclear that GGA or anyone else can show that polygamous marriages are a relevantly different kind of beast from two-person marriages. If you don't want polygamy recognized, you set yourself a very hard task if you try to rule it out on metaphysical grounds.

So are we on a slippery slope? Not at all and precisely because the law isn't about language or metaphysics. Legal marriage is a human-made institution. What its boundaries are doesn't depend on what conjugal relationships "really" are, and doesn't depend on what falls under the dictionary definition of "marriage." It's a virtue of the law that in making laws, we can appeal to pragmatic and policy reasons. If there are good policy reasons for ruling out marriages with more than two partners, we can do that whatever the metaphysics. The same goes for the case of consanguinity. We don't need to plumb the depths of marriage's essence to decide where we want to draw those kinds of lines.

Notice, in fact: for all I've said, there might be excellent policy reasons for not recognizing same-sex marriage. If there were, that could be reason enough not to recognize them; no need to rifle dictionaries or worry about essences and natures. My view is that the case is very much in favor of same-sex marriage, but that's another post. The point here is that worrying about what "marriage" really means or what marriage really is "essentially" doesn't get us anywhere. It doesn't even help conservatives make their own case.

Benedict, Homosexuality and Equality Laws: What He's NOT Saying

Let me start with a couple of caveats that I'd like any readers to keep in mind. I do not think homosexual relationships are immoral; on the contrary: for years I've been a strong advocate of gay rights and have given money and time to the cause. I also think that the Roman Catholic's teachings on sexuality are flawed from top to bottom. But Benedict VI has objected to proposed laws in Britain that would ban discrimination against homosexual people. If we want to argue with he is saying, we need to be clear about what he isn't saying.

Consider a hypothetical case. Mary is in charge of hiring a new staff member for a Roman Catholic organization in a small town. There are two candidates and because it's a small town, Mary knows both of them personally. One, Alex, is heterosexual. The other, Robin, is homosexual by orientation but believes homosexual relations are wrong and leads a chaste life. Mary knows both of these things. Alex could do the job competently. But Robin, as it turns out, is clearly better qualified. Should Mary reject Robin for the position on the grounds that the Church is opposed to homosexuality?

What would the Pope say? Based on what the Church actually teaches (teachings that then-Cardinal Ratzinger had a large role in articulating) I'd expect him to say this: it would be wrong for Mary to reject Robin simply because Robin is homosexual. Repeat that: if Benedict were to speak consistently with Church teaching, he would say that this sort of discrimination would be wrong.

Now add a third candidate, Kerry. Kerry is homosexual and has a same-sex partner. Kerry also disagrees with Church teaching on homosexuality. However, Kerry is even better qualified than Robin. What would Benedict say about this case?

My understanding: he'd draw a line here. Neither Robin's nor Kerry's orientation is the issue. The issues are: how do they act on that orientation, and what are their views on the Church's teaching? Benedict's view, as I understand it, is that the law shouldn't compel the Church to erase that line.

Is this what the law would do? I don't know. I haven't studied the legislation and I'm not a lawyer. But if it would, I'd find that troubling. The trouble doesn't come from sympathy with the Church's teaching on sexuality; I'm utterly unsympathetic to that. The trouble is that, in general, if an organization is in the business of advocating certain views, it ought to be able to take that into account when it decides who to hire. Suppose an organization takes defending view X as part of its mission. If a job candidate publicly rejects view X or openly behaves in ways that X wouldn't allow, then in general, the organization ought to be able to take that into account.

Of course, there's a good deal else that's troubling in this case. My own view is that what the Church teaches about homosexuality is not just mistaken but has done a good deal of harm. Laws that forbid discrimination against homosexuals are a public recognition of the wrongness of the way gay people have so often been treated. The idea of granting exemptions is more than a little uncomfortable.

One way of doing rough justice might be to say that organizations who want to discriminate in this way should get no public funds. The Church, of course, gets no direct public funding. However, in the USA (can't speak about the UK) some Church organizations that provide social services do. One solution is to say: either don't discriminate or don't take public funds. On balance, that's the solution I incline towards, but it comes at a cost: some of these organizations provide valuable services that might not be easily replaced. That said, whatever the right solution, my purpose here was more limited: it was to be clear about what Benedict and the Church are not saying. Without that, there's no chance of a productive discussion.